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Interest Sensitivity of MMDAs
The moneymarketdepositaccount(MMDA) is the
first liquid short-term small-denomination deposit
account in recent history to be free from interest
rate ceilings. The account has been very success-
ful, with balances currently over $460 billion
nationally. Designed to compete with the money
funds, the MMDAsucceeded in attracting an
estimated $90 billion from them during its first 3
months and also drew funds from banks' and
thrifts' large and small time deposits.
Since the MMDA attracted funds from interest-
sensitive sources such as the money funds and
large time deposits, one mightexpect MMDA
balancesto be interest-sensitive. Oneofthe major
uncertainties surrounding the MMDA's introduc-
tion was just how sensitive itwould be to interest
rate differentials. IfMMDA balances were highly
interest-sensitive, banks could attract deposit
inflows with marginally higher interest rates. This
would mean that MMDAdeposits would have
rates that behaved Iike rates on certificates of
deposit(CDs), moneyfunds, orotheropen-market-
return instruments, and most likelythatthe level of
MMDA rates would be close to those on open-
market instruments as well. Ifthis were true,
MMDAs would be a relatively costly source of
deposits.
If, instead, MMDAs were relatively interest rate
insensitive, then depositorswould be less likelyto
shift their funds from bank to bank oroutofthe
banking sector unless they received large or last-
ing rate differences. To the extentthatthecompar-
ative advantage ofbanks is in providing financial
intermediation services at the retail level, banks
could benefit by having a stable new source of
retail funds whose cost was likelyto be not only
less than wholesale deposits but much less vari-
able as well.
In this Letter, we summarize the results ofour
study ofthese issues, which appears in the Spring
1985 Economic Review ofthe FRBSF. Our
empirical analysis uses monthly data on the rates
and quantities ofdeposits in MMDAs and other
accounts for a sample of59 banks in the Twelfth
Federal Reserve District. Data for individual
banks, unlikeaggregate data, enable us to address
questions of interbank competition.
Sluggish response of retail deposits
Retail deposits at banks respond sluggishly, or
incompletely, to interest rate differentials with
other banks orwith wholesale interest rates (e.g.,
those on Treasury bills). That is, a bankwill not
lose its retail core deposits instantaneously if it
pays slightly less than the prevailing market rate.
In a perfectly competitive market without adjust-
mentcosts, depositorswouId be expected towith-
drawfunds immediately from institutions offering
below market rates of return. Large wholesale
deposits, such as negotiable CDs, which are
traded in a national market and therefore are very
sensitiveto interest rate differentials, dobehave in
this manner, but retail deposits apparently do not.
One explanation for the sluggish interest-rate
responsiveness of retaiI deposits is that depositors
incurtransaction and information costs when
opening new accounts. In practice, itwould be
worthwhiIe fordepositorsto switch accounts only
iftheexpected gainfrom switching banks exceeds
the cost ofdoing so. The transaction and informa-
tion costs ofopening a new account include the
time costs required to learn about a bank's rates,
services, location and procedures, and to fill out
the forms required to open an account. Yet, forthe
individual depositor, these "investment" costs of
opening an account must be incurred again ifhe
switches to another bank or nonbank investment
alternative.
The relative importance ofthese costs likely
diminishes as account size increases since many
ofthem do not vary with respect to account size.
We therefore would expect those retail accounts
with the smallest balances to be the least interest-
sensitive. Since personal MMDA balances aver-
age around $15,000, we would expect them to be
insensitive compared to larger accounts.
Flannery has shown that banks pay for partof
these "adjustment" costs depositors face. By
sharingthese costs, both banks and depositorswiII
have incentivesto minimizeshifting amongbanks
because they would want to minimize the costs
associated with such shifts. Thus, retail deposits,
particularly small deposits, respond sluggishly or
incompletely to temporary interest rate fluctuations.FRBSF
The adoption of MMDAs
In previous Letters, we have argued that MMDAs
lowered deposit costs for banks while increasing
returns for depositors. Interest ceilings had led
banks to substitute underpriced or nonpriced
services for interest payments and also to substi-
tute wholesale deposits for retail deposits. Both of
these responses to ceilings were more costly than
direct interest rate competition would have been.
Thus, the MMDA, by allowing banks to attract
funds directlythrough pricecompetition, was akin
to a newcost-saving technology.
Buteven when anewcost-savingtechnologysuch
as the MMDA is introduced, the adoption ofthat
technologywiII notbe instantaneous. The costs of
learning about the new technology as well as the
costs involved in actually adopting itcan taketime
and be relatively expensive. Thus, the rate of
adoption ofa newtechnology depends on the
cost-savings it promises compared to the informa-
tional and other adjustment costs involved in
adopting it.
Banks apparently expected substantial long-run
cost savings by attracting funds into MMDAs
because most institutions offered them immedi-
ately and many institutions waged aggressive
advertising and promotional pricing campaigns.
Although depositors responded rapidly to the
above-market promotional rates on the new
account, ouranalysis ofthe pattern ofadoption of
MMDAs for banks in the western states indicates
that, on average, depositorstooka Iittlemorethan
three monthsto reallocate theirportfolios. (See the
chartwhich shows ittookat leastthree monthsfor
MMDAdeposit levels to stabilize.)
Some depositors may have delayed reallocating
their portfolios becausetheywerewaitingfortime
deposits to mature before shifting them into
MMDAs. However, this cannot fully explain why
adjustment was notmore rapid. Transfers from
money funds, for example, can be accomplished
simply by writing a check, yet the period of run-
offs from the money funds was about the same
length as that for time deposits. This suggests that
opening new MMDA accounts must have
involved significant adjustment costs.
Pricing pattern
The adjustment-cost hypothesis predicts thatthe
pricing ofa new, lower cost retail account such as
the MMDA would have the following pattern: Pre-
mium interest rates would be offered during the
introductory period, followed by a reduction in
rates to below-market levels as inflows tapered off.
Also, weexpected MMDA rates to be much less
variable than wholesale rates after portfolios were
reallocated because ofsignificantadjustmentcosts.
We expected banks tooffer premium rates initially
to depositors to compensate them partially for the
costs oftransferring assets into newMMDA
accounts. Compensation was necessary because,
unlike existing accounts where deposits can be
added relatively costlessly, almost all additions to
MMDAs duringthe introductory months were to
new accounts. But after the adjustment phase was
completed, premium rates would serve only to
drive up MMDAdeposit costs without attra,fting a
significant volume of new accounts because such
premiums would have to be paid on existing as
well as new accounts. Banks would then have to
use other methods, such as bonuses, to compen-
sate persons opening new MMDA accounts.
We expected MMDA rates to be below open-
market rates afterportfolios were largely realloca-
ted because ofadditional MMDA features such as
federal deposit insurance, ATM access, and banks'
cost ofproviding retail account services.
In the chart, we plotthe average rates paid on
MMDAs and money funds over time. The chart
shows that, as expected, the MMDA rate was
considerably higher than the money fund rate
duringthe initial period of rapid deposit inflows,
butthat the rates were close by March of 1983
when deposit levels had stabilized. Also, follow-
ingthe adjustment period, therewas considerably
less variation in theMMDArate than in the money
fund rate. The behavior ofMMDA interest rates
therefore indicates that banks are pricing these
accounts as retail deposits rather than as whole-
sale funds.
In the months following the introductory period,
MMDAs proved to be a stable source ofdeposits
despite long periods when wide rate differentials
favored money market funds (see chart). At the
national level, MMDA growth stagnated over this
period, butthere was notthe major shift out of
MMDAsthatwould have resulted ifMMDAswere
as interest-sensitive as wholesale deposits.
Introductory period
To estimate just how sensitive MMDAs were to
interest rate changes, we performed a statisticalanalysis on our sample of59 western banks ofthe
relationship between abank'sMMDAdeposits, its
MMDA rate, and the average rate offered by the
money funds. We first examined the three-month
introductory period of rapid MMDA inflows.
Once new accounts were established, there were
relatively few adjustments in the quantityoffunds
in the accounts. Indeed, banks also madeefforts to
retain these funds by linkingthem tootherservices
and products, thereby increasing their overall
convenience to depositors. This added conven-
ience, however, increased the cost (inconven-
ience) ofclosing an account.
Post-introductory period
During the post-introductory period, MMDAs
exhibited much less short-run interest sensitivity
and behaved more likeotherretail deposits. Once
the initial rapid growth subsided, adjustment to a
change in rates took much longer, with the esti-
mated long-run interest sensitivity over 30 times
the short-run (one-month) elasticity.
Competition from the money funds
Ourresults also suggest thatmoneyfunds provided
important competition to MMDAs. We found a
statistically significant, but small, short-run rela-
tionship between MMDA deposits and rates paid
on money funds, confirming that these two
accounts are substitutes. That is, when money
funds' rates rose relative to MMDA rates, MMDA
deposits declined. This finding is consistent with
the sizable initial shiftoffunds from the money
funds into MMDA and also with the stagnation of
MMDA depositgrowth that occurred when money
funds' rates substantially exceeded MMDA rates
duringthe summer of 1984. Still, in the long-run,
MMDAdeposits are sensitive to moneyfund rates.
This suggests thatwhile large differences in the two
rates can exist temporariIy, a persistent differential
ultimately will cause a significant shifting offunds.
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Conclusions
MMDA deposits were interest-sensitive (even in
the short-run) during their initial promotional
period when funds wereshifted rapidly intothem.
However, once depositors reallocated their port-
folios, the speed ofadjustment to changes in rates
was much slower. Consequently, MMDA balances
were less responsive to interest rates in the short-
run than they had been initially. This pattern of
growth in MMDA deposits is consistent with the
existence ofsignificant costs in opening new
accounts. Onceaccountswereopened, these costs
ensured that depositors would shift their funds
only slowly in response to interest differentials.
While money funds and MMDAs are substitutes,
they are not as close substitutes as some had anti-
cipated, at least in the short-run. Thus, MMDAs
appearto be astable sourceofdeposits, much like
other retail or "core" deposits. They are unlike
wholesale funds, which are very interest-sensitive,
both in the short- and long-run.
Consistentwith a much slower adjustment, our
findings also indicate much lessshort-run interest
rate sensitivity after February 1983. For example,
in the post-introductory period, MMDAs were
only 1/15 as interest-sensitive in the short-run as
during December 1982. However, even during
the post-introductory period, the accounts were
still sensitive in the long-run to interest rate
differentials. Thus, a bank's long-run percentage
ofMMDAs in total deposits depended on the





























During the introductory period, we found a rapid
reallocation ofportfolios to include substantial
MMDA deposits. Moreover, MMDA accounts
were initiallyvery interest-sensitive. In December,
for example, banks with 1 percent higherMMDA
rates (on average, about 10 basis points) attracted
over3 percent more MMDA deposits. Our anal-
ysis ofthe pattern ofMMDA inflowsfor individual
banks indicates that higher introductory rates
accelerated the adjustmentofMMDA deposits to
their "equilibrium" level for individual banks,
although they had little impacton institutions'
long-run level ofMMDAsrelative tototal deposits.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 191,365 322 11,204 6.2
Loans and Leases 1 6 172,972 305 11,900 7.3
Commercial and Industrial 5.1,995 - 133 2,642 5.3
Real estate 62,999 9 2,749 4.5
Loans to Individuals 34,223 83 6,168 21.9
Leases 5,363 1 354 7.0
U. S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,442 44 - 540 - 4.5
Other Securities2 6,951 - 27 - 156 - 4.1
Total Deposits 198,069 3,550 8,316 4.3
Demand Deposits 47,904 2,361 2,289 5.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,798 2,086 408 1.3
Other Transaction Balances4 13,921 835 1,113 8.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,245 356 4,913 3.7
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,995 455 4,676 11.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,290 - 154 - 1,133 - 2.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed Money5 22,953 790 3,293 16.7
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-l
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change